Using opium as a public revenue source - not as easy as it looks: the British Hong Kong experience by Tso, KKS & Cullen, R
Title Using opium as a public revenue source - not as easy as itlooks: the British Hong Kong experience
Author(s) Cullen, R; Tso, KKS
Citation British Tax Review, 2012, v. 2, p. 1-26
Issued Date 2012
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/177320
Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
February 22, 2012 
 
 
 
Using Opium as A Public Revenue Source – 
Not as Easy as It Looks: The British Hong Kong Experience 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
Richard Cullen and Kevin K.S. Tso 
 
 
CONTACT DETAILS 
 
 
 
Richard Cullen 
 
richard.cullen@gmail.com 
 
 
 
 
Kevin K.S. Tso 
 
kevintso@hku.hk 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
February 22, 2012 
 
Using Opium as A Public Revenue Source – 
Not as Easy as It Looks: The British Hong Kong Experience  
by 
 
Richard Cullen and Kevin K.S. Tso1 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The broad aims of this article are: to summarise the reasons the colonial 
government in Hong Kong decided to make the internal retail trade in opium a 
major source of revenue; to explain the operation and enforcement of this 
revenue system; to evaluate the fiscal performance of this revenue system; and 
to consider its contemporary and lasting impact on the development of Hong 
Kong. Our primary research focus is on the first 50 years of the operation of the 
system for it took almost this long for the revenue raising performance of the 
system finally to match the original, fund-raising expectations.  
 
As we explain, despite this problematic experience, the opium trade helped, over 
time, to boost government income indirectly (while, at the same time, the opium 
revenue system, itself, gradually established a firm fiscal footing). One could say 
that the ‘fiscal fix’ Hong Kong found itself in when the opium-based revenue 
regime slipped below expectations was put right as a result of the way that the 
overall opium trade powered the early Hong Kong economy; the ‘fiscal fix’ thus 
worked after all. 
 
                                                 
1  Kevin Tso is a Year 4 LLB student in the Faculty of Law at Hong Kong University (HKU).  
Richard Cullen is a Visiting Professor in the Faculty of Law at HKU.  He was previously a 
Professor at Monash University in Australia.  He is a Research Associate at Civic Exchange (a 
Hong Kong Think Tank), Convenor of the Taxation Law Research Programme at HKU and a 
Research Fellow in the Taxation Law and Policy Research Institute at Monash University. A 
presentation based on a draft of this paper was delivered to the Melbourne Chinese Studies Group 
(MCSG) in June, 2011. The authors wish to express their thanks for comments made by 
participants in the MCSG seminar and to Paul Macgregor, the Convenor of the MCSG, for his 
additional comments. The authors would also like to thank Dr. Xu, Yan from Hong Kong 
University and Dr. Andrew Coleman from Monash  University for their helpful comments. The 
authors remain responsible for the views expressed in this article.  
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One aspect of these developments in Hong Kong which is notable is that British 
Hong Kong modelled its early opium revenue system on the system which had 
already been operating in British Singapore for around 20 years before the British 
first acquired Hong Kong Island in 1841.  In fact, unlike in Hong Kong, the 
Singapore opium revenue system proved to be highly effective from the outset 
(and on a long-term basis) as a direct generator of public revenues.  There is not 
space in this article to investigate this comparative anomaly in depth but we do 
discuss certain possible reasons why this divergence may have occurred, below. 
 
 
A Brief Overview of the Opium Trade 
 
Opium, a drug derived from the latex of the opium poppy and which is commonly 
linked to notions of trade, colonial development and war, did not actually become 
a valued item of high volume international trade until the 19th century when it was 
exported to China, above all, for ‘recreational’ purposes. Prior to that, and for 
much of its history, opium was primarily used for medicinal purposes where it 
served above all as a painkiller. One of the earliest records of opium’s medicinal 
role dates back to 1500 B.C. where its uses were noted by the Ancient Egyptians 
in the Ebers Papyrus.2   
 
The rise of opium’s prominence in international trade as a valued commodity was 
in part due to the trade imbalances that many of the European powers, most 
notably Britain, had developed with China by the start of and during the 19th 
century. In the case of Britain, trade with China was almost exclusively handled 
by the East India Company (EIC)3 which was very influential and had very close 
ties to the British government. Exports of tea, silk and porcelain, which were 
highly sought-after in the domestic UK market, generated large trade surpluses 
for China. In contrast, China was largely self-sufficient and uninterested in British 
products. The Chinese imperial court also adopted a somewhat high-handed 
attitude in dealing with foreign trade epitomized by the Qing (Manchu) Dynasty 
Emperor, Qianlong, who claimed “our Celestial Empire possesses all things in 
                                                 
2  M. J. Brownstein, “A brief history of opiates, opioid peptides, and opioid receptors” (1993) Proc 
Natl Acad Sci USA Vol. 90 (12), 5391 
 
3  The EIC was also known as the East India Trading Company. It was founded in 1600 by royal 
charter granted by Queen Elizabeth I and was initially given a monopoly over all of Britain’s trade 
in the East. ‘East’ meant (or came to mean) all of Asia plus south-east Asia It played a vital role in 
the expansion of the British Empire and was a dominant player in world trade until it was 
dissolved by an Act of Parliament in 1874.   
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prolific abundance” and therefore has “no need to import the manufactures of 
outside barbarians in exchange of our own produce”.4  
 
The British (and other) opium traders had largely been able to ignore (Qing 
Dynasty) attempts to stop the trade. Finally, in 1839, the Chinese Emperor took 
much stronger action than hitherto, when he appointed Lin Zexu, an official with a 
powerful and deserved reputation for incorruptibility, as Special Imperial 
Commissioner to Canton to suppress the opium trade. Lin swiftly confiscated and 
destroyed 20,283 chests of British opium valued at around £2 million.5 This event 
prompted the British government to send an expeditionary force to China in 
retaliation, triggering the start of the First Opium War that ultimately resulted in a 
Chinese defeat6 and the ceding of Hong Kong Island to the British under the 
Treaty of Nanking in 1842 (the British had taken actual possession of Hong Kong 
Island in 1841)..    
 
The opium trade would continue to flourish in China for years to come and it was 
not until 1906 that China mustered the will to end its ‘opium addiction’ once and 
for all with the Emperor issuing an edict that all opium importing, growing and 
retailing must end in ten years time.7 China was able to obtain the support of the 
United States in its efforts and this culminated in a bargain with Great Britain in 
                                                 
4  S. Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004), 5- 
This statement was made by Emperor Qianlong during Lord Macartney’s first embassy to China 
(1792-1794). Lord Macartney was sent by King George III to China with the goal of opening the 
country to trade with Britain but due to cultural differences and tensions over protocol (including 
the British emissaries refusal to kowtow in front of the Chinese Emperor), the embassy ultimately 
ended in failure. The Qing Dynasty, China’s last Imperial Dynasty lasted from 1644 to 1912.   
 
5  Tsang, above fn.4, 9-10 - Before the British traders surrendered their opium stocks to 
Commissioner Lin, they were reassured by then Chief Superintendent of Trade, Captain Charles 
Elliot, that the British government would compensate them for their losses. This meant that the 
opium stocks which Lin confiscated were technically property of the British government and their 
subsequent destruction a direct blow to the British imperial treasury (ibid.).  
 
6  Lin Zexu was born in 1785 in Fujian Province. He rose rapidly through the ranks of the senior 
bureaucracy. China’s defeat in the First Opium War resulted in Beijing using Lin as a scapegoat 
for this defeat. He was punished by being sent to a remote posting in Xinjiang. His career never 
really recovered. He died in 1850. See, H. Chang, Commisioner Lin and the Opium War 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963). 
 
7  E. N. La Motte, The Opium Monopoly (New York: MacMillan, 1920) Chapter 15 (History of the 
Opium Trade in China) at: http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/history/om/om15.htm [accessed, 
June 10, 2011]. 
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1907 in which both nations agreed to diminish opium export and cultivation over 
a ten year period.8 This method proved to be successful and by 1917, China was 
practically rid of opium.9 However, the closing of the China market did not spell 
the end of Hong Kong based dealings in opium. Demand for opium continued to 
be met in other markets, including within the established Crown Colony of Hong 
Kong. It was not until after the World War 2 - and at the strong insistence of their 
American allies - that the British Commander-in-Chief, who ran the interim 
administration of post-war Hong Kong, issued a proclamation, in September 
1945, which declared a total prohibition on the sale and distribution of opium in 
the colony.10  
 
 
The Founding of British Hong Kong 
 
Much of Hong Kong’s history is intrinsically linked to and in some instances even 
considered by scholars to be a ‘by-product’ of the opium trade that flourished in 
Asia during the nineteenth century. This drug’s relationship with Hong Kong is 
best summarised by historian Christopher Munn who wrote that ‘the colony was 
founded because of opium; its principal merchants grew rich on opium and its 
government subsisted on the high land rent and other revenue made possible by 
the opium trade’.11  
 
One might also add that opium contributed directly to the social development of 
the colony. For example, one of the best regarded, secondary level educational 
institutions in Hong Kong today, the Belilios Public School, was founded on the 
philanthropy of a successful opium trader.12  
                                                 
8  Ibid.  
 
9  Ibid. 
 
10  M. Booth, Opium: A History (London: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 173. 
 
11  C. Munn, “The Hong Kong Opium Revenue 1845-1885” in T. Brook & B. T. Wakabayashi, (eds.) 
Opium Regimes: China. Britain and Japan, 1839-1952 (California: University of California Press: 
2000), 107 
 
12  The Belilios Public School (previously the Central School for Girls) was established in 1890 and 
was mainly funded by a donation of $25,000 from Emmanuel Raphael Belilios, a remarkably 
successful Hong Kong opium trader and philanthropist. Mr. Belilios also made donations to help 
set up the Alice Memorial Hopsital, scholarships to help needy students pursue an education in 
universities and a probation home to help Chinese girls that had been driven into crime and 
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Munn’s first point, above, is easy to understand as the cession of Hong Kong to 
the British was a result of the First Opium War.13 The second point alludes to 
Hong Kong’s importance as a ‘central warehouse’ for opium export to China and 
to Chinese overseas communities14 (it was estimated that in the late 1840s 
three-quarters of the total opium crop produced in India passed through Hong 
Kong15).  
pium as a direct public revenue source for sustaining the colony of 
ong Kong.  
unorthodox revenue sources) on 
e shaping of the Hong Kong revenue regime. 
                                                                                                                                                
 
Notwithstanding the extensive literature surveying the impact of the international 
opium trade, one aspect of that trade which has been under-researched to date 
is the role of o
H
 
This article seeks to evaluate the importance of opium revenue to the 
development of the public revenue system in the colony. We first look at the 
reasons which prompted the colonial government to seek revenue from opium 
and the initial process of carrying this out. We then explore the problems 
associated with making this revenue system work despite the seeming ‘relative 
ease’ of establishing an opium revenue system. Comparison will be made here to 
other sources of government revenue to show that, while revenue derived from 
opium failed to fund the growing colonial administration in the manner initially 
anticipated, alternative sources of revenue, especially land-related revenue, 
played a vital role in taking over much of the public funding role that opium was 
originally to fill. Finally, we look at how various factors came together to enhance 
the success of the opium revenue system significantly. We also discuss the long-
lasting impact of opium (and other somewhat 
th
 
 
 
prostitution by poverty.  For more information, please refer to http://www.belilios.net/ & 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belilios_Public_School [accessed, January 7, 2011].  
 
13  Tsang, above fn.4, 14-15 – The First Opium War, also known as the First Anglo-Chinese War, 
lasted from 1839 to 1842. This war ended with the signing of the Treaty of Nanking on August 29 
1842 which ceded Hong Kong Island to British control.  
 
14  Important overseas markets for Hong Kong’s prepared opium included the Chinese migrant-
mining communities in California and Australia.  
 
15  Munn, “The Hong Kong Opium Revenue 1845-1885”, above fn. 11, 107 
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The Hong Kong Opium Monopoly 
troduction 
atheson & Co. 
hich conducted their opium-related businesses via Hong Kong.  
olonial government principally derived their 
irect opium-based, public revenue.  
                                                
 
In
 
Much of the focus in relation to the study of Hong Kong and the opium trade has 
had a sociology or criminology focus or has centred on Hong Kong’s strategic 
proximity to China and the vital role it played as a safe depot for the opium before 
it was transported, especially to (Qing Dynasty) China, illicitly at first. Later the 
trade was legalised by the Chinese government under British pressure at the 
conclusion of the Second Opium War via the Treaty of Tientsin in 1858 when 
opium became a ‘foreign medicine’.16 Opium was also traded from Hong Kong to 
overseas Chinese communities. The research emphasis in the past also appears 
to have focused most on the large foreign firms such as the American firm 
Russell & Co. and the British firms Dent & Co. and Jardine M
w
 
It was true that these firms were intricately linked to and dominated most of the 
opium trade with China as part of what William Jardine of Jardine Matheson & 
Co. once referred to as “the safest and most gentlemanlike speculation I am 
aware of”.17 None of the norms of this larger opium trade applied to the supplying 
of opium within the Hong Kong colony, however. In fact, the trade in opium within 
Hong Kong was regulated (initially and mainly – see further below) through a 
government-conferred monopoly licensed chiefly to local Chinese entrepreneurs 
who, through the trade, rose to form part of the Chinese elite within the colony. It 
was from this internal trade that the c
d
 
 
16  P.K. Lee, “Drug Policy and Legislation in Hong Kong 1841-1959” MA Thesis (Hong Kong: The 
University of Hong Kong, 1999), 23. The Treaty of Tientsin was signed in 1858. The Chinese 
government had decided to legalise opium in China as it needed to raise revenue, inter alia, to 
finance military expeditions to suppress rebellions which broke out in the 1850s (including the 
Taiping Rebellion). By legalising the opium trade, opium was no longer considered contraband in 
China and was thus subjected to import tariffs levied by the Chinese government. Subsequently, 
large scale opium cultivation in China also commenced. 
 
17  C. A. Trocki, Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy: A study of the Asian opium trade 
1750-1950 (New York: Routledge, 1999), 101 – In the early years of Jardine Matheson and Co.’s 
founding, it dealt almost exclusively in the opium trade. It was a very lucrative business as the 
average profit per chest of opium was $20 and in the 1830s, they were able to trade over 6000 
chests each year to generate an annual profit of over $100,000.   
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The Need for Opium-Based Revenue 
ies to be financially self-reliant so 
s to avoid burdening the imperial treasury.18  
t had to seek a reliable source of revenue in order to 
chieve self-sufficiency. 
promising, Hong Kong had been declared a free port in 1841 so it was unable to 
                                                
 
The signing of the Treaty of Nanking officially ceded Hong Kong Island to British 
control and marked the start of colonial Hong Kong. From the outset the young 
colony was besieged by many crises threatening its survival, one of which was 
how to fund and maintain the colony itself. Following the loss of the American 
Colonies in the American War of Independence (1775-1783), British Empire 
policies were developed which required colon
a
 
This local-funding policy encountered resistance from British traders who were 
discontented about having to pay internal taxes and licensing fees in order to 
support colonial development and they feared that their commercial interests 
would be affected by the local administration. This conflict between colonial 
officials and the merchants generally boiled down to “whether the state existed to 
serve the needs of the British merchant or to promote its own interests as well.”19 
The British traders argued that Hong Kong was only “a seat of English 
Government in China” and was part of the British Embassy in China, so its costs 
“ought to be borne by the nation.” The colonial officials, on the other hand, 
argued that “of course” Hong Kong was a colony and the standard colonial 
practices should apply.20 Ultimately, the colonial officials prevailed and the Hong 
Kong colonial governmen
a
 
To find a source of revenue for the colony was both challenging and problematic. 
Having been described by Lord Palmerston as ‘a barren rock with hardly a house 
upon it’21, Hong Kong clearly lacked natural resources or established industries 
to rely upon as a revenue base. Although the opium trade with China seemed 
 
18  T.W. Ngo, “Industrial History and the Artifice of Laissez-faire Colonialism” in T.W. Ngo (ed.) 
Hong Kong’s History: State and society under colonial rule (New York: Routledge, 1999), 133. 
 
19  H.H. Traver, “Colonial Relations and Opium Control Policy in Hong Kong, 1841-1945” in H.H. 
Traver & M.S. Gaylord, (eds.) Drugs, Law and the State (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University 
Press, 1992),138. 
 
20  Ibid, 138-139. 
 
21  Tsang, above fn.4, 14. 
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rely on any trade tariffs to raise revenues.22 Any levy duties on trade would also 
have triggered bitter political opposition from British merchants in Hong Kong.23 
Therefore, the colonial government turned to deriving revenue from ‘internal’ 
business activities inside the colony, mainly in the form of selling Crown land (in 
the form of leaseholds – see below) and from internal opium consumption.    
 
The introduction of the policy of using opium as a key source of government 
revenue was not without its critics, many of whom, in both Britain and Hong 
Kong, questioned the moral and political implications of raising revenue from 
opium. When Colonial Treasurer R. Montgomery Martin first presented the idea 
to the British Parliament, critics viewed this as making a “private vice a source of 
public revenue”24 and the future Chief Justice of Hong Kong, Sir John Smale, 
described opium as one of the “three evils” of Hong Kong.25 However, these 
objections were dismissed by the Governor of Hong Kong, Sir John Davis, on the 
grounds that the administration was to classify opium “with spirits [alcohol] and 
such other unnecessary stimulants”26 which were readily taxed to raise revenue. 
Governor Davis also noted that despite China having yet to legalise opium, there 
was a ‘perfect understanding’ between the British and Chinese governments that 
each shall adopt their own laws regarding opium.27 The passing of Ordinance 
No.21 of 1844 (entitled the Opium Ordinance) in the Hong Kong Legislative 
Council established the beginning of the colonial government’s monopoly over 
the sale of retail opium. 
 
 
                                                 
22  Traver, “Colonial Relations and Opium Control Policy in Hong Kong, 1841-1945”, above fn.19, 
136. 
 
23  Lee, above fn. 16, 9 
 
24  Parliamentary Papers, British Parliamentary Paper: Report of Select Committee on Commercial 
Relations with China, Vol. 38 (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1971), 456 
 
25  Munn, “The Hong Kong Opium Revenue 1845-1885”, above fn. 11,108, 123 – Sir John Smale 
was Chief Justice of Hong Kong from 1866 to 1881. He considered the “three evils” of Hong 
Kong to be the opium trade, the licensing of brothels and female slavery. 
 
26  Parliamentary Papers, British Parliamentary Paper: Correspondence, Dispatches, Reports, 
Ordinances, Memoranda and other Papers Relating to the Affairs of Hong Kong 1846-60, Vol. 24 
(Shannon: Irish University Press, 1971), 20-21. 
 
27  Traver, “Colonial Relations and Opium Control Policy in Hong Kong, 1841-1945”, above fn.19, 
137. 
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Operation of the Opium Monopoly 
 
Under Ordinance No.21 of 1844, the colonial government’s opium monopoly 
operated by relying on a system called the ‘opium farm’28. The opium farm was a 
legal monopoly to sell raw and prepared opium in amounts of less than one chest 
that was granted by the colonial government by way of competitive bid. The 
highest bidder would be leased the monopoly for one year and was known as the 
‘opium farmer’.29 The opium farmer had the liberty of setting the retail price of 
opium and could board vessels to search for illicit (retail) opium.30 The opium 
farmer’s monopoly was further protected by penal sanctions in Ordinance No.21 
of 1844 which made it a criminal offence for anyone to possess opium (for 
consumption) that had not been bought from the farmer.  For the first offence, the 
offender had to pay a fine of 100 dollars and was liable to two months 
imprisonment; for the second offence, to a fine of 250 dollars and imprisonment 
for four months and for every subsequent offence, to a fine of 500 dollars and 
imprisonment not exceeding six months.31 This, in theory, allowed the opium 
farmer to enjoy the all the profits derived from the internal sale of opium while 
alleviating fears that competitors would enter the market and siphon off his profits 
or drive down prices.  
 
This model shared similarities with other British colonial monopolies and, in 
particular, it closely resembled the Singapore opium monopoly. Singapore, like 
Hong Kong, was blessed with a natural well sheltered, deep water harbour. In 
each case, this factor particularly attracted the British. Singapore was acquired 
for the EIC by Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, from the Sultan of Johor, as a 
trading post in 1819. Singapore was ceded in perpetuity to the EIC in 1824 and 
incorporated into the Straits Settlements in 1826. Like Hong Kong, Singapore 
was established as a free port so customs duties could not be applied and trade 
could not be directly taxed. An opium farm system was first established in 
Singapore as a key source of public revenue in 1819, very shortly after the EIC 
                                                 
28  Today we might call such an arrangement an ‘opium franchise’. The term farm used in the 
ordinance did not, of course, refer to some sort of horticultural farm. Rather the term indicated a 
‘farming out’ of the right to retail opium within British Hong Kong. 
 
29  Traver, “Colonial Relations and Opium Control Policy in Hong Kong, 1841-1945”, above 
fn.19,137 
 
30   Lee, above fn.16,12 
 
31  Ibid, 12 
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acquired the new colony. The opium farm quickly established itself as a mainstay 
of the public revenue system in Singapore. Over the next 80 years it generated 
40% or more of the colony’s locally generated revenue.32 Successive Hong Kong 
Governors saw this Singapore revenue regime as a successful model to 
imitate.33  
 
It should be noted that government-granted monopolies were not uncommon in 
Hong Kong and many industries, both necessary services (such as (in due 
course) electricity production) and private vices (such as brothels) were under a 
monopoly or licensing system in the colony at one time or another. One of the 
most famous and long-lasting of these monopolies, which still exists today, is the 
Hong Kong Jockey Club (formerly the Royal Hong Kong Jockey Club). The Hong 
Kong Jockey Club holds a monopoly on all gambling activities in the city and is 
both the Hong Kong government’s largest taxpayer and the city’s largest private 
donor to charities, contributing over HK$1 billion to charity annually.34  
 
This system of monopolies and licences reflected the British administration’s key 
objectives of: controlling undesirable activities while keeping them at arm’s-length 
and; generating revenues from these controlled activities.         
                                                 
32  See C. A. Trocki, “Drugs, Taxes and Chinese Capitalism in Southeast Asia” in T. Brook & B. T. 
Wakabayashi, (eds.) Opium Regimes: China. Britain and Japan, 1839-1952 (California: 
University of California Press: 2000). In fact, other colonial regimes (for example the French and 
Dutch) relied on opium farm, public revenue systems (as well as direct taxation of trade). From 
1886-1895, around 35% of total public revenues in the Netherlands East Indies were opium-based 
and from 1861-1895 about 30% of all public revenues in French Indo-China were derived from 
the opium farm system (ibid.). 
 
33  Munn, “The Hong Kong Opium Revenue 1845-1885”, above fn. 11, 105-106. The Singapore 
opium monopoly was far more successful than the Hong Kong opium monopoly, though there are 
no conclusive reasons as to explain why this was so. This difference seems even more baffling 
when one also notes that Hong Kong fairly soon had a larger Chinese population than Singapore 
(plus access to millions of potential smokers in China and a more vibrant export market). 
Christopher Munn suggests it might possibly be due to the lack of already established, indigenous 
Chinese elites in Hong Kong for the British to collaborate with in managing the growing Chinese 
population. It was estimated that Hong Kong Island originally had a population of around 7,000 
comprised of mostly fishing families when the British took possession (see, Tsang, above fn.4, 18) 
In fact there was a great level of mistrust between the British authorities and the Chinese 
bourgeoisie (as they migrated, above all from neighbouring Guangdong Province, and began to 
establish themselves) and business co-operation between the two was often centred on immediate 
gains rather than building long-term relations, according to the above view…  
 
34  For more information see: http://corporate.hkjc.com/corporate/history/english/index.aspx 
[accessed, June 6, 2011]. 
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The first opium monopoly was auctioned off to British merchants George Duddell 
and Alexander Mathieson who were unsuccessful and only maintained the 
monopoly for three months before selling it off to a Chinese collaborator of the 
colonial government, Lo Aqui.35 The primary reason that the Duddell-Mathieson 
monopoly failed was because of their inability to enforce their monopoly by 
stopping the flow of competing illicit opium. Their efforts were further frustrated 
when Chief Magistrate William Caine ruled that the opium monopoly did not 
extend to opium purchased for the purpose of export regardless of how small the 
quantity might be, which made it extremely difficult to prosecute smugglers (into 
Hong Kong) successfully.36 Lo Aqui, on the other hand, had close connections to 
(if he was not the actual leader of) the Chinese syndicates in early Hong Kong 
and could therefore muster the manpower to enforce the monopoly e.g. by 
boarding ships to search for illicit opium.37 Lo was further helped by the passing 
of a new opium ordinance in July 1845 which effectively plugged the loophole by 
making the sale of opium in quantities of less than one chest ‘for any purpose’ 
subject to the opium monopoly.38  From then on the opium monopoly was mainly 
leased to the Chinese whom Governor Davis indicated were the best opium 
farmers “as the farmers themselves are Chinese, their perfect knowledge of their 
own countrymen  renders them incomparably the best tax-gatherers in a case 
of this kind.”39  
 
Despite the expectation that the opium farm would be a reliable source of 
government income, the revenue from opium still lagged behind other sources 
(e.g. liquor licences) in the first three years of its operation (1845-1847). This was 
mainly due to the continuing wide availability of illicit opium and the particular 
                                                 
35  Munn, “The Hong Kong Opium Revenue 1845-1885”, above fn. 11, 112 
 
36  Ibid, 113. 
 
37  T. P. L. Cheung, “The Opium Monopoly in Hong Kong 1844-1887” MPhil Thesis (Hong Kong: 
The University of Hong Kong, 1987), 71-73 – Lo Aqui, who was also known as Lo Aking, was 
head of the Lo clan in Hong Kong. Besides being the opium farmer, he also engaged in money-
lending, gambling and running brothels in Hong Kong. He often relied on the Triad societies to 
protect his interests. For example, when the Governor’s Residence was raided by bandits and Sir 
John Davis lost a watch, it was recovered soon after by Lo Aqui once he was told of it (ibid.). 
 
38  Munn, “The Hong Kong Opium Revenue 1845-1885”, above fn. 11, 113 
 
39  Ibid, 111 
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conflict of interest between the opium farmer and the colonial administration.40 
As the opium farmer was mainly concerned with maximising his return on his 
investment, he could flood the market with prepared opium just before his lease 
was due to expire. This helped make the opium farm lease less attractive and 
drove down the price of the bid needed to secure the next lease.41  
 
This forced the government to replace the opium farm system in 1847 with an 
opium licensing system which was similar to the licensing system for liquor and 
allowed opium to be sold by a number of licensed dealers. The aims of this new 
policy were to introduce more competition into the retailing of opium and to 
increase government revenue derived from opium.42 It was expected that the 
increased competition would bring down the price of retail opium and dissuade 
the illicit sale of opium by making the illegal dealings less profitable.43 The end 
result was meant to be a significantly increased sales volume of legal opium. 
However, the licence system was ultimately unsuccessful: it only produced 
average annual revenue of less than £2000 in the ten years it was in operation,44 
an amount even lower than the opium farm system. While the increased 
competition did succeed in lowering the retail price of opium, the price of illicit 
opium was still cheaper than that of licensed opium. Perhaps more importantly, 
under the licensing system, there was no person or body tasked with the 
discovery and confiscation of illicit opium, thus allowing its continued, too 
comfortable, flow onto the Hong Kong market.45 
 
With the end of the Second Opium War (1856-1858) and the signing of the 
Treaty of Tientsin in 1858, the opium trade was legalised in China and the 
colonial government decided to remove all restraints on the sale of raw opium in 
Hong Kong so that traders could now, without any regulatory difficulty, process 
                                                 
40  Traver, “Colonial Relations and Opium Control Policy in Hong Kong, 1841-1945”, above fn.19, 
137 
 
41  Ibid. 
 
42  Ibid, 139. 
 
43  Lee, above fn. 16,19 
 
44  Cheung, above fn. 37, 126. 
 
45  Traver, “Colonial Relations and Opium Control Policy in Hong Kong, 1841-1945”, above fn.19, 
139 
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raw opium in the colony for export to China.46 Ordinance No.21 of 1844 was 
replaced by Ordinance No.2 of 1858, which removed all restrictions on the 
distribution of raw opium but the sale and distribution of prepared opium (ready 
for human consumption) remained a government monopoly. This had the effect 
of further securing Hong Kong’s position as a major centre of commerce for the 
opium trade with China.  
 
The city’s continuing free port status meant that the larger, external opium trade 
with China was not subject to import duties while the internal sale and 
consumption of opium within the colony remained subject to the monopoly 
(licence-based) system authorized by the government.47  
 
The opium farm system was also reintroduced under the new ordinance to 
replace the existing licensing system and the offence for the possession of illicit 
opium was increased so that for the first offence, the offender was liable to pay a 
fine of 250 dollars and three months imprisonment and for every subsequent 
offence, a fine of 500 dollars and imprisonment not exceeding six months 
applied.48 The ordinance also introduced incentives for informers to report 
offenders to the authorities by rewarding the informer with “one-half of the 
pecuniary penalty (if any) imposed on the defendant by the court”.49 These new 
measures were introduced so as to help the opium farmer enforce his monopoly 
in order to make the opium farm licence more attractive to potential bidders.     
 
The signing of the Chefoo Convention in 1885 between Britain and China had a 
large impact on the Hong Kong colonial government’s opium revenue. The 
Chefoo Convention was particularly aimed at stopping the smuggling of illicit 
opium into China (especially from Hong Kong).  
 
The colonial government implemented Opium Ordinance No.22 of 1887 to give 
effect to the Convention.50  Under this new ordinance, movement of raw and 
prepared opium within the colony was once again forbidden without the consent 
                                                 
46  Ibid. 
 
47  Ibid, 140 
 
48  Lee, above fn.16, 27 
 
49  Ibid, 28 
 
50  Ibid, 31 
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of the opium farmer, and additionally, all smuggled opium which had been 
confiscated had to be returned to the opium farmer.51  
 
This created an ‘excellent loophole’ in that the opium farmer occupied an 
‘enviable position’ where he could now smuggle opium into China without any 
real fear about the loss of his opium. If his illegal shipments were detected by 
British authorities then, by law the confiscated opium would be returned to him - 
and he could either sell the opium internally in Hong Kong or try once again to 
smuggle it into China.52 Moreover, any confiscated opium sent by rival smugglers 
was also returnable to the opium farmer. 
 
This new development made the opium farm a very attractive business 
proposition to many. There was real competition in bidding for the opium farm 
licence, driving up the value of bids and allowing the colonial administration to 
benefit significantly.53 Finally, the original aim for opium to form a major source of 
revenue for the colonial administration was realised. Opium-related revenues 
doubled, for example, between 1888 and 1889 and direct opium-based revenues 
remained notably far more robust (than had previously been the case) in 
subsequent years – see Table 1, following. 
 
 
Other Sources of Revenue54 
 
From the above discussion, we can see that revenue collection based on opium 
retailing proved, compared to the Singapore experience, to be rather 
disappointing over a period of decades following the establishment of British 
Hong Kong.  Opium-related public revenues in Hong Kong varied between 5-
15% of total public revenues with many years producing a return of less than 
10% of total revenues (see Table 1, following). These figures were far below the 
                                                 
51  Traver, “Colonial Relations and Opium Control Policy in Hong Kong, 1841-1945”, above fn.19, 
140 
 
52  Ibid, 141 
 
53  Ibid. 
 
54  This Section and the next draw on arguments made in R. Cullen and A. Wong, The Foundations of 
the Hong Kong Revenue Regime (2008) at: http://www.civic-exchange.org/wp/the-foundations-of-
the-hong-kong-revenue-regime-2/ [accessed, June 5, 2011]. 
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40% of total public revenues consistently derived, year-on-year, from opium-
based transactions in (also duty free) Singapore.55 
 
In fact, this major shortfall (compared to the initial outlook) proved to be notably 
less harmful for the new colony’s fiscal good health than might have been 
expected. The key explanation for this outcome is the success of the parallel 
land-based revenue system introduced into the colony virtually from its inception. 
 
Brown and Loh explain that the early development of what remains, to this day, a 
fundamental aspect of the operation of the Hong Kong revenue regime – land-
transaction revenues – derived from the fact that the very first Hong Kong 
governments were able to assert that they owned the superior title to all land.56 
As noted earlier, British Hong Kong, initially (from 1841/42) consisted only of 
Hong Kong Island.  The Kowloon Peninsula was added in 1860. The small 
number of existing residents appear to have been mainly fishermen and families 
who lived on their boats plus some farmers. In the eyes of the colonizers, it 
seems these locals lacked any firm claims over dry land areas.57 (When the 
British acquired the New Territories in 1898, the land rights of indigenous, long 
settled farming communities were recognized.58) 
 
Brown and Loh maintain that: 
 
At the outset, the administration decided that any interests in land sold to 
the private sector should be leasehold interests, rather than the freehold 
interests that could have been offered. The only practical way of releasing 
land was through auction and the first auctions were held in the 1840’s.  
Commentators were already describing the frenetic bidding from the 
merchants and volatility of the market. To prevent abuse, the leasehold 
interests were granted with terms attached limiting the types of usage, 
which eventually became the key determinant in assessing the economic 
value of a piece of land. 
 
                                                 
55  See discussion above re British Singapore. 
 
56  S. Brown, and C. Loh, Hong Kong: The Political Economy of Land (2002), 8-9, at: 
http://www.civic-
exchange.org/publications/2002/The%20political%20economy%20of%20land.pdf [accessed, June 
7, 2011] 
 
57  The total local population at the time of the occupation of Hong Kong Island by the British was 
around 7,000. See Tsang, above fn.4, 18 
 
58  Brown and Loh, above fn. 56, 8-9, See, also, R  Nissim, Land Administration and Practice in 
Hong Kong (2nd. Ed.) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008) Chapters 1 and 2. 
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In the initial years after the founding of the colony, there was some 
discussion back and forth with Whitehall over what interests in land should 
be sold, whether freehold land should be released, and whether auction 
was the correct approach. Some twenty years after Hong Kong’s founding, 
an expedient decision was made. The British garrison in Hong Kong was 
not to be funded from Whitehall any longer, and government ownership of 
the land market in Hong Kong was proving to be a good revenue 
generator to help pay expenses.59 
 
 
Property rates were imposed on the new property (leasehold) owners also, 
almost from the outset.60 Another early (and continuing) impost introduced in 
Hong Kong was Stamp Duty, in 1866.61  
 
A further early source of revenue came through taxes and fees related to 
gambling. The Hong Kong Jockey Club (HKJC) (previously the Royal Hong Kong 
Jockey Club) was founded in 1884 to run and promote horse racing.62 Excise 
Duties (for example on hydrocarbon oil; alcoholic drinks and tobacco products) 
have also long been imposed in Hong Kong.63   (Estate Duty was applied from 
the 1930s. It was never a major revenue-raiser (it applied only to Hong Kong 
assets) and it was entirely suspended in 2006.64) 
 
Remarkably, British Hong Kong was able to survive and thrive in terms of 
revenue-raising for around 100 years without need to resort to any sort of income 
tax. The first, effective (though highly restricted) income-type taxes date from 
1947 with the passing of the Inland Revenue Ordinance which used a fully 
schedular system to impose separated, business, property and personal 
                                                 
59  Brown and Loh, above fn. 56 
 
60  R. Nissim, Land Administration and Practice in Hong Kong (2nd. Ed.) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 2008), Chapters 1 and 2. 
 
61  Stamp Duty Ordinance (1866) – today, Stamp Duty Ordinance (1981).  See, also, J. Lou, “Hong 
Kong: An Offshore Financial Centre in the Far East – Its Present and Future” (1998) 52 Bulletin 
for International Fiscal Documentation,  297 
 
62  The HKJC was established to operate on a non-profit basis. See, Hong Kong Jockey Club – 
History, at: http://www.hkjc.com/english/corporate/corp_history.asp [accessed, June 7, 2011] 
 
63  See, Hong Kong: Customs Excise, at: 
http://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/factsheets/docs/customs.pdf  [accessed, June 6, 2011] 
 
64  Estate Duty Ordinance (1932).  See, too, Abolition of Estate Duty – Inland Revenue Department 
Press Release, at: http://www.ird.gov.hk/eng/ppr/archives/07042501.htm  [accessed, June 6, 2011] 
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extertion income taxes (though only on income with a Hong Kong source).65 That 
is, there was (and still is) no general, global income tax nor any taxation of 
interest (for the most part) nor dividends. Predictably, perhaps, Hong Kong has 
yet to see any need to introduce either a formal capital gains tax nor any sort of 
general sales or consumption tax.66  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
By 1890, 55% of China's imports and 37% of her exports passed through Hong 
Kong.67 Over the first 50 years, economic growth in British Hong Kong was, in 
sum, notably impressive. As in the case of another key East Asian, British 
Empire City-State, Singapore, a foundation stone of this economic success was 
the trade in opium.68 
 
Despite this huge growth in trade, especially in the opium trade, and Hong 
Kong’s pivotal role, the Hong Kong government battled with only limited success 
for several decades to use opium-based transactions as a primary if not the 
primary source of public revenue for the new colony. This lack of success 
seemed odd given the comparative ease with which Singapore (and other 
                                                 
65  See, further: M. Littlewood, Taxation Without Representation: The History of Hong Kong's 
Troublingly Successful Tax System (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010); and Cullen, 
and Wong, above fn. 54. A Wartime Revenue Ordinances was introduced in 1940 and a revised 
version became law in 1941 but the income taxes applied never really had time to take effect 
before the Japanese overran British Hong in early December, 1941. 
66  Cullen and Wong, ibid. A serious attempt was made in 2006 to canvass the possibility of 
introducing a Goods and Services Tax (GST) in Hong Kong – but the Hong Kong government 
back away from this pubic consultation exercise before it was completed in the face of powerful 
public opposition (and a resurgent economy). See: A. Wong, “The Source of the Source Problem 
in Hong Kong (And How to Respond to It)” (2011) Hong Kong Law Journal (Vol.41) 
(forthcoming). 
 
67  Rating and Valuation Department of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, A 
Chronology of Events, at: http://www.rvd.gov.hk/en/publications/chron_events.htm [accessed, 
June 6, 2011]  
 
68  See, for example: E. N. La Motte, The Opium Monopoly (New York: MacMillan, 1920) at: 
http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/history/om/om15.htm [accessed, June 10, 2011]; and C. 
Feige, and J. A. Miron, “The Opium Wars, Opium Legalization, and Opium Consumption in 
China” at: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/miron/files/opiumwars_ael.pdf [accessed, 
June 10, 2011]. 
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colonial outposts in East Asia) had been able to deploy an officially-sanctioned 
opium monopoly regime to raise very significant public revenues. 
 
It is true that, as Hong Kong was declared a Free Port from the outset of its 
founding, there was no way to derive revenue from the import-export trading 
activities in opium (or other goods). But this restriction also applied to Singapore. 
As we noted earlier, the most credible explanation advanced for this interesting 
discrepancy is that the British administration in Singapore, at its founding as a 
British Colony, was able to work with certain established Chinese trading elites 
who could see the benefits of running the new opium farm over the longer term. 
In Hong Kong, at the same point in its history, there were, it appears, no similarly 
(long-term) motivated elite groups with which to work. 
 
Ultimately, this early comparative failure of the Hong Kong opium revenue regime 
to match expectations proved to be less than crucial. The ‘fiscal fix’ which the 
depleted revenue flows created was made good by other public revenue 
streams, most of all by income derived from land-related transactions.  
 
From its inception, British Hong Kong did not allow (virtually) any sale of freehold 
land.69  All land was made available as leasehold land (with strict conditions 
attached to each particular leasehold-usage). And landholders wishing to vary 
the usage allowed on a particular lease had, on each such occasion, to pay a 
premium to the Hong Kong government to secure the variation - see Table 2, 
following.   
 
Moreover, the practice grew of restricting the availability of land for development. 
This tended to drive up the price of land (towards the upper limits of what the 
market would accept) and also revenue receipts.70 When one factored in the 
                                                 
69  The Hong Kong Anglican Cathedral occupies freehold land.  Landholders in the New Territories 
have also historically been allowed, by the government, to enjoy certain special rights to land 
based on ancestral rights which derive from membership of long established communities in the 
New Territories.  See, further, Nissim, above fn. 60. 
 
70  In 1995/96, during the last years of British rule, the Hong Kong government still derived some 
32% of total revenues from land-related transactions (including sales, lease modification 
premiums and Stamp Duties – but not including Profits Tax and Salaries Tax arising directly from 
the real estate sector) see, C. Loh, “The Government’s High-Land-Price Policy: Can Hong Kong 
People Afford it?” at: http://www.citizensparty.org/housing/landpric.html [accessed, June 6, 
2011].  See, too, D.A. Bell, “Hong Kong’s Transition to Capitalism” at: 
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3745/is_199801/ai_n8787332 [accessed, June 6, 
2011]. When one adds in the Profits Tax paid by developers and all the others involved in 
construction, transaction based Stamp Duties and Salaries Tax paid by those working in the sector, 
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consistent strong, opium-based, growth in the economy over the first 50 years, 
the Hong Kong government found that its land-based revenue regime more than 
compensated for the shortfall in expected funding from the opium-based revenue 
stream. Indeed, the colony’s fiscal foundations proved to be so sturdy that, within 
around 40 years of its founding, the Hong Kong government had already 
amassed more than one year’s total normal pubic expenditure in fiscal 
reserves.71 
 
This land-related revenue regime was further strengthened as the total area 
comprising the Crown Colony increased significantly, initially in 1860 and then in 
1898.  The expansion of Hong Kong increased the Hong Kong government’s 
‘land-bank’ greatly.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the HKSAR government has continued to rely, in recent years, on land transaction related 
revenues for around 50% of its income, see, A. Halkyard, “The Hong Kong Tax Paradox” (1998) 
Revenue Law Journal (Vol. 8),1.This heavy reliance on land transaction revenues in Hong Kong 
bears some resemblance to the theories propagated by Henry George, the 19th century American 
economist and social reformer who long advocated the introduction of a single tax on the 
unimproved value of all land to replace all other taxes.  See, J.P. Smith, Taxing Popularity: The 
Story of Taxation in Australia (Canberra: Federalism Research Centre, 1993),18-24. A Henry 
George follower (also a Quaker) Lizzie Magie, created the precursor to the board game Monopoly 
in 1904 to demonstrate his theories (see: http://www.answers.com/topic/henry-george [accessed, 
June 6, 2011].). 
 
71  In 1884, Hong Kong was one of the few colonies within the British Empire carrying zero debt. In 
fact Hong Kong ran a current account surplus for most of the years from 1873 to 1882 with that 
surplus in some years reaching close to 20% of total expenditure thus allowing the accumulation 
of very significant reserves. See, The Colonial Office List for 1884. (London: Harrison, 1862-
1925), 18, 92. (This savings habit has persisted; in mid-2011 Hong Kong’s public foreign reserves 
exceeded US$250 billion (see: http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/statistics/msb/attach/C05.xls 
[accessed, June 7, 2011).) of which approximately US$76 billion are Government Fiscal Reserves 
(over 20 months of total current Hong Kong government expenditure.) see: 
http://www.hic.com.hk/eBulletin/tax/budget2011-12/budget.html [accessed, June 7, 2011].) The 
Hong Kong government has also historically been able to control expenditure quite effectively. 
Services were limited in keeping with 19th century practice but even more so given the remarkable 
self-reliance (repeated examples of dire poverty notwithstanding) of the majority Chinese 
population. This was the case from when the British established their Hong Kong colony and it 
remains the case to a very large extent, today. Goodstadt argues convincingly that Hong Kong’s 
social spending policies have long been and remain deeply flawed – a position made all the more 
indefensible given the HKSAR’s massive fiscal reserves and familiarity with world-wide best 
practice, see, L. F. Goodstadt, Uneasy Partners; The Conflict  Between Public Interest and Private 
Profit in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005). 
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In 1945, Hong Kong’s per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was, by some 
estimates, lower than that of India and Kenya.72 By 1992, Hong Kong’s per 
capita GDP had overtaken that of the UK.  By 2004, Hong Kong was ranked at 
23 in a global, ‘highest GDP per head’ table, ahead of Canada and Australia.73 
Wealth distribution in Hong Kong remains very uneven; significant poverty 
persists. But there is no denying that the British City-State materially transformed 
itself over the decades following 1945, from a war ravaged colony of less than 
800,00074 to a leading international service centre with a population of some 7 
illion.   
modern tax system and insist on the collection of proper 
conomic statistics.75   
st 
ar – are rooted in Hong Kong’s rather special fiscal - and economic - history.  
an extraordinarily successful, low tax, trading economy which long ago gave up 
                                                
m
 
It is worth noting, too, that the post-war governments in Hong Kong were, in fact 
quietly but actively hostile to the idea of seeking low-cost development finance 
from the World Bank when Hong Kong was being re-built right through into the 
1960s. Almost certainly, Hong Kong would have qualified to borrow from this 
then new international financial institution (which had been established in 1947). 
Successive Hong Kong governments implied they would accept such loans if 
they were offered on ‘reasonable terms’ – whilst, in reality, avoiding entering into 
any such borrowing for fear of the way the World Bank might begin to demand 
changes in the Hong Kong government’s preferred economic model. In 
particular, the government worried that the World Bank would strongly advocate 
the adoption of a more 
e
 
We raise these observations from more recent times because we believe that 
that the robust attitudes taken by successive Hong Kong governments in the 
modern era – and the stunningly successful recovery of Hong Kong after the la
w
 
The direct and indirect, opium-based fiscal foundations laid in the first 50 years of 
the colony proved to be remarkably strong. The indirectly strengthened land-
based revenue system has proved to be so successful that it remains a mainstay 
of the Hong Kong fiscal regime to this day. On these foundations has been built 
 
72  J. Bartholomew, The Welfare State Made Britain Poor – extract from book at: 
http://www.moneyweek.com/article/593//the-welfare-state-made-britain-poor.html [accessed, June 
6, 2011]. 
 
73  Pocket World in Figures 2005 (London: The Economist – Profile Books, 2004) p.28. 
 
74  See: http://www.demographia.com/db-hkhist.htm [accessed, June 6, 2011]. 
 
75  L. F. Goodstadt, Profits Politics and Panics: Hong Kong’s Banks and the making of a Miracle 
Economy, 1935 – 1985 (Hong Kong: Hong University Press, 2007), 98-100. 
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being opium-reliant.76 These foundations were also fundamental in allowing the 
colony to thrive without need to resort to any sort of direct income taxation for 
around 100 years – and when such taxes came they were kept low and simple 
(as they still are). The very high levels of economic activity have been an 
important factor in maintaining sufficient revenues using a minimalist taxing 
approach. That minimalist taxing approach has, in turn, amplified the 
attractiveness of Hong Kong as a trading centre. A more business (or taxpayer) 
friendly tax regime operating within a normal (non-palm-tree) integrated trading 
economy would be difficult to find. 
 
Those early experiences also demonstrated to Hong Kong that, even when 
financial public policies do not proceed according to plan, other alternatives 
which can help put things right may well emerge – provided your economy 
maintains strong growth. But how does a jurisdiction arrange to sustain such 
overall, remarkable economic growth across a time span of more than 150 
years? Any sort of full response to this question requires a further article but it is 
possible to state briefly and with confidence that, above all, this growth - and 
Hong Kong’s success - are attributable to the cross-generational, consistent 
energy, hard work, intelligence and remarkable self-reliance of the local 
population.77 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
76  As noted in Part 2, above, against remarkable odds and as a product of an agreement between the 
UK and Qing Dynasty China, the officially sanctioned trade in opium between Hong Kong and 
Mainland China was increasingly and greatly reduced between 1907 and 1917.  See, E. N. La 
Motte, The Opium Monopoly (New York: MacMillan, 1920) Chapter 15 (History of the Opium 
Trade in China) at: http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/history/om/om15.htm [accessed, June 10, 
2011].  
 
77  Goodstadt puts it this way: "There was never any need for the rulers to keep the people of Hong 
Kong at a distance or to exclude them from participation from government....It would have been 
hard to find anywhere a society more socially responsible and tolerant, more politically mature 
and self-reliant, or a people easier to serve and rule. They were ideal constituents, the secure 
foundations on which Hong Kong's success had been built despite the economic turbulence and 
political uncertainty..." see, L. F. Goodstadt, Uneasy Partners; The Conflict  Between Public 
Interest and Private Profit in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), 228. 
There is claim, possibly apocryphal, that Friedrich Hayek once observed that “socialism is an 
excellent system – for up to 12 people”. The socio-economic operation of the typical Chinese 
family in Hong Kong lends a certain positive credence to this claim. 
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Table 1: Opium Revenue compared to the Total Revenue derived from 1844 
– 1894 
 
Year  
Total Opium Revenue 
(£) 
Total Revenue Collected 
(£) 
1844                     X 9534
1845 2384 22,242
1846 4118 27,047
1847 3183 31,078
1848 1867 25,072
1849 1566 23,617
1850 1406 23,526
1851 1313 23,721
1852 1479 21,331
1853 1497 24,700
1854 1856 27,045
1855 2558 47,973
1856 2587 35,500
1857 2462 58,842
1858 4508 62,476
1859 5867 65,225
1860 10,393 94,182
1861 12,412 127,241
1862 15,921 131,512
1863 16,175 120,078
1864 16,312 132,884
1865 14,389 195,919
1866 15,346 160,226
1867 19,694 199,040
1868 19,985 236,295
1869 22,637 192,464
1870 23,558 190,673
1871 23,767 175,962
1872 25,500 192,714
1873 26,145 176,579
1874 27,291 178,107
1875 28,541 186,818
1876 27,708 184,405
1877 27,500 209,398
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1878 29,042 208,500
1879 46,186 212,121
1880 45,104 235,411
1881 41,345 291,409
1882 45,985 266,120
1883 34,983 283,706
1884 25,044 257,667
1885 33,828 275,443
1886 39,273 300,985
1887 40,132 314,098
1888 40,060 342,640
1889 94,257 401,220
1890 99,500 415,671
1891 81,229 421,938
1892 84,979 466,028
1893 63,500 432,945
1894 71,000 476,501
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Table 2: Land Leases and Land Premiums compared to the Total Revenue 
derived from 1844 – 1894 
Year  
Land Leases (£) 
(Rent on Land for 
Buildings/ Leased 
Lands) * 
Premiums on Land 
Sold  (£) 
Total 
Revenue 
Collected (£) 
1844 5545                     X 9534 
1845 12,067                     X 22,242 
1846 12,388                     X 27,047 
1847 13,996                     X 31,078 
1848 12,175                     X 25,072 
1849 10,035                     X 23,617 
1850 11,416                     X 23,526 
1851 11,127 43 23,721 
1852 9,061 192 21,331 
1853 11,455 165 24,700 
1854 10,266 1179 27,045 
1855 11,199 15,720 47,973 
1856 14,389 1141 35,500 
1857 14,847 14,743 58,842 
1858 17,907 1894 62,476 
1859 18,050 1493 65,225 
1860 17,878 18,182 94,182 
1861 20,625 36,374 127,241 
1862 21,688 29,710 131,512 
1863 27,212 1352 120,078 
1864 24,293 2778 132,884 
1865 30,886 12,218 195,919 
1866 28,395 255 160,226 
1867 29,153 12,812 199,040 
1868 26,901 3062 236,295 
1869 27,228                     X 192,464 
1870 25,754                     X 190,673 
1871 24,935 83 175,962 
1872 24,602 83 192,714 
1873 24,383 201 176,579 
1874 24,485 237 178,107 
1875 24,510 606 186,818 
1876 24,512 2979 184,405 
1877 25,115 17,706 209,398 
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1878 25,076 2,298 208,500 
1879 27,174 293 212,121 
1880 26,076 1250 235,411 
1881 25,649 42,429 291,409 
1882 29,264 3,821 266,120 
1883 29,962 5,358 283,706 
1884 32,528 4,103 257,667 
1885 30,150 13,887 275,443 
1886 31,102 7,236 300,985 
1887 34,166 32,341 314,098 
1888 32,630 33,477 342,640 
1889 34,834 33,234 401,220 
1890 37,535 3,401 415,671 
1891 37,533 10,783 421,938 
1892 39,556 25,381 466,028 
1893 43,927 13,119 432,945 
1894 47,616 14,853 476,501 
 
* Note: Excludes premiums on land sold (Starting from 1860 premiums 
accounted for a large part of revenue regarding land, sometimes even exceeding 
land leased). Premiums typically were paid to convert land-use terms in existing 
leases.   
 
** 1878 - 1889 opium revenue & total revenue; courtesy of Lucy Cheung’s 
research. Please see: Cheung, Tsui Ping Lucy. “The Opium Monopoly in Hong 
Kong 1844-1887” MPhil Thesis (Hong Kong: The University of Hong Kong, 1987) 
 
*** Note: From 1878 onwards, there was a change to using the dollar instead of 
the pound. The figures from 1878 onwards are calculated by hand using the 
exchange rate listed in The Colonial List for 1884 with 1 dollar rated at 4s 2d (4 
shillings and 2 pence).  
 
 
 
 
